#define my_iounmap(x, b) (((long)x<0x100000)?0:vfree ((void*)x))
-#define capable(x) suser()
-
#define tty_flip_buffer_push(tty) queue_task(&tty->flip.tqueue, &tq_timer)
#define signal_pending(current) (current->signal & ~current->blocked)
#define schedule_timeout(to) do {current->timeout = jiffies + (to);schedule ();} while (0)
* This has now become a routine instead of a macro, it sets a flag if
* it returns true (to do BSD-style accounting where the process is flagged
* if it uses root privs). The implication of this is that you should do
- * normal permissions checks first, and check suser() last.
+ * normal permissions checks first, and check fsuser() last.
*
- * [Dec 1997 -- Chris Evans]
- * For correctness, the above considerations need to be extended to
- * fsuser(). This is done, along with moving fsuser() checks to be
- * last.
- *
- * These will be removed, but in the mean time, when the SECURE_NOROOT
- * flag is set, uids don't grant privilege.
+ * suser() is gone, fsuser() should go soon too...
*/
-static inline int suser(void)
-{
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && current->euid == 0) {
- current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
static inline int fsuser(void)
{
}
/*
- * capable() checks for a particular capability.
- * New privilege checks should use this interface, rather than suser() or
- * fsuser(). See include/linux/capability.h for defined capabilities.
+ * capable() checks for a particular capability.
+ * See include/linux/capability.h for defined capabilities.
*/
-
static inline int capable(int cap)
{
-#if 1 /* ok now */
- if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap))
-#else
- if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? current->fsuid == 0 : current->euid == 0)
-#endif
- {
+ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return 1;
}